Nuclear deals with iran

Tehran says removal of Trump official will not bring prospect of talks with Washington closer. Rouhani says Tehran will begin research on speeding up uranium enrichment. Macron spearheads drive to de-escalate tensions in the Gulf. Zarif arrived after Trump clashed with leaders over Iran and Russia. Renamed vessel leaves territory after Washington fails in last-ditch move to hold it. Court in British overseas territory rules that Grace 1 tanker seized last month is free to leave.

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Add to myFT Digest. Thursday, 17 October, Sunday, 13 October, Analysis The Big Read. Wednesday, 2 October, Sunday, 29 September, Anwar Gargash. How to reduce Gulf tensions with Iran. Thursday, 26 September, News in Focus podcast 14 min listen. Why would Iran attack Saudi Aramco's oil facilities? Wednesday, 25 September, Tuesday, 24 September, There's this provision that's often talked about that creates a maximum wait time of 24 days to get into a facility. It might be shorter than that if Iran agrees to let inspectors in earlier, but it could take as long as 24 days for inspectors to get in some facilities.

The President has made the point, which I think is correct, that if Iran has a covert enrichment facility where it's trying to enrich uranium outside of the bounds of the deal, even if we have to wait 24 days, we'd still be able to go in and see what's going on there; whether because it's difficult to move the equipment, or because traces of enriched uranium are going to remain.

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But there are also activities that Iran could be doing covertly that they could hide in 24 days, and that window could give them time to get away with it. This is what is often referred to as PMD — the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program. This sort of experiment is not about creating fissile material for a nuclear weapon but the designing of the weapon itself, and whether that's experimenting with explosives or miniaturizing those explosives to try to fit them into a warhead.

Those are things that are often done on computers or in small facilities are much easier to hide. I think there is legitimate concern about whether there are some activities that Iran might try to do during the term of this deal that this inspections regime is not adequate to catch.

The second concern is that we believe that those sorts of PMD weaponization activities have been ongoing for most of the last decade, if not longer. We've been constantly trying to get Iran to fess up to them and to give a full accounting to the IAEA of the activities it's carried out. It has repeatedly stonewalled. It is not clear in this deal whether Iran is actually required to now give a full accounting of its PMD activities, because instead of being part of the deal, the PMD process is moved to a parallel track with the IAEA. Iran has signed an agreement with the IAEA to try to address some of these issues.

That agreement is confidential between Iran and IAEA, and so members of Congress and the American public haven't been able to see it to judge whether it's adequate. We've seen some leaks in recent days about what might be in those documents.

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That would suggest that, in fact, whatever inspections are going to be carried out over that process aren't going to be done by the IAEA or by the international inspectors, but will be carried out by the Iranians themselves, which raises questions about their credibility if those accounts are correct. There are areas of concern. I think they are not in the most important areas.

The enrichment facilities that are the quickest way to a nuclear weapon for Iran are going to be properly safeguarded. But there are areas on the sides where it looks like it might be possible for Iran to cheat, and our ability to dissect it will be compromised by some of the concessions made with this deal.

BM: We're certainly better off with this deal. I think raising concerns about the limitations of the inspections regime is not necessarily a way to criticize the deal, but a way, as I said before, to remain clear-eyed about the limitations of the deal overall; and not to rest on our laurels that we have completely addressed the Iranian nuclear threat. BM: I think first and foremost it's going to go largely to rebuilding the Iranian economy, which has been damaged and dampened by nearly a decade of increasing international and multilateral sanctions.

The Iranian people have definitely been hurting. We've seen the Rial be continually devalued, and their economy has contracted for the past three years. In fact, President Hassan Rouhani was elected first and foremost on the expectation that, through international engagement, he could improve the economic conditions of the Iranian people.

I think the government definitely needs to deliver on those promises. But what we've seen is that even in times of economic hardship, the regime in Tehran has spent tens of million or billions of dollars on its nuclear program; on arming and supporting terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon; and propping up the Assad regime in Damascus.

I think the question is: If it was able to find the resources to do that when its people were suffering, what will it find the resources to do when they're flush with injections of cash from abroad? I think the expectation is that it's going to now have the ability to both improve the plight of the Iranian people, improve its economy, invest in infrastructure, and develop new oil and gas fields. But [it will] also the ability to increase its assistance to terrorists groups and the various regimes it props up in the region, as well as build up its own military capabilities.

BM: I would certainly expect so. I think more effective than the safeguard and monitoring conditions in this deal is the promise of what they get fifteen years from now: All sanctions lifted and the ability to have a full-fledged nuclear program as long as they would like. There seems to be little reason for them to cheat.

I expect they're likely to test the boundaries of the deal, [there are] likely to be questions of interpretation, but there's not going to be large-scale cheating over the next fifteen years. Again, as I said, it's a question of: fifteen years from now, will we be able to prevent a nuclear Iran? And what condition will the Iranians be in to try to develop a nuclear weapons capability if that is what they want at that time? BM: I think, ironically, what is seen as one of the positive developments of this deal is reopening greater diplomatic engagement between Tehran and Washington, and breaking what was effectively three decades of mistrust.

But at the same time, the most practical and pragmatic policy response to this deal is to spend the next fifteen years investing in regime change in Iran. What will best serve the interests of not just the United States, but I think the Middle East and the Iranian people, is the possibility that fifteen years from now, we have a democratic and responsible government in Tehran that respects the rights of its citizens, and international law, and the sovereignty of its neighbors.

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What that would look like in terms of U. It would require much greater support for Iranian civil society, democratic activists, and Iranian free media than we've seen over the past couple of years, when in fact we cut back on some of the investments we were making in that area so as not to alienate Tehran at the same time as we were trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with them.

In fact, you can look back to the Green Movement, the large protest that happened in Tehran around Iran in response to what they thought was a stolen presidential election and the brutal crackdown that followed. Compare the large silence of the United States in the face of those crackdowns to the U.

A reinvestment in looking for democratic change makes the most sense, in addition to trying to constrain nefarious Iranian activities in the region; which means checking the flow of weapons from Iran to other groups, as we've done somewhat in Yemen and Syria, and trying to confront its proxies more aggressively wherever we can, including Hezbollah, which is operating freely now in Syria, and the Assad regime in Damascus. BM: The next question is about the indirect effects that this deal is going to have on U.

I think what we've already heard, not just from Israel, but U. I think at a time when we're not just dealing with conflict in the Middle East, but also Russia and China, there's a concern here that some of our heretofore allies in the Middle East might look elsewhere for their security guarantees. I think it's incumbent upon the United States to make sure that does not happen.

I don't think we'd like to see a Saudi Arabia that leaves the U. Khaneshan is the owner of Shaherzad Restaurant on Westwood Boulevard. Khaneshan says if the deal goes through, spices like saffron could be half the price they are now. As a local businessman this is good news for his kitchen. Down the street from Sheharzad, Yossi Samimi feels very differently. He says the pending deal is a nightmare. His negotiators were extremely naive.

As an Iranian Jew, his concern lies with his family in Israel. Measures in the agreement also prevented Iran from building a single heavy water reactor for 15 years. When the JCPOA was put in place, measures were implemented to ensure Iran could not develop nuclear weapons in secret. Iran committed to what the White House described as "extraordinary and robust" monitoring, verification and inspection.

The inspectors also ensure that no materials can be taken to secret locations where bombs could be developed.

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The White House said suspicions could be triggered by holes in the ground that could be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, and isotope alarms. Iran still has sanctions on its missile technologies and conventional weapons, as well as terror list sanctions that identified them as state sponsors of terror.

What do Israel's accusations mean for the Iran nuclear deal?

The US also has the authority to target the country's development of ballistic missiles, human rights abuses and censorship. It also has the authority to sanction Iran's destabilising regional activities, including in Syria and Yemen. The US President abandoned the Iran nuclear deal on 7 May , claiming it did not address Iran's ballistic missile programme or its roles in Middle Eastern conflicts.

The president said no action taken by Iran had been more dangerous than its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and claimed the deal had allowed Iran to enrich uranium and "cause havoc within the Middle East and beyond". Mr Trump added that the accord - which he described as "an embarrassment" to him "as a citizen" - allowed a nuclear arms race to develop in the Middle East.

He said pre-existing US sanctions on Iran would be reinstated, telling reporters: "If the regime continues its nuclear aspirations, it will have bigger problems than it has ever had before. Donald Trump reimposed economic sanctions against Iran in August - three months after the US announced it was pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal. The first set of sanctions targeted financial transactions that involve US dollars, Iran's automotive sector, the purchase of commercial planes and metals including gold.